Materiality Immaterial? Revisiting Standards for Securities Fraud Class Certification in Amgen v. Connecticut Retirement Plans and Trust Funds by Nguyen, Nancy My
NGUYEN FINALIZED 2 (DO NOT DELETE)  1/29/2013 12:04 PM 
 
 
MATERIALITY IMMATERIAL? 
REVISITING STANDARDS FOR 
SECURITIES FRAUD CLASS 
CERTIFICATION IN 
AMGEN V. CONNECTICUT 
RETIREMENT PLANS AND TRUST 
FUNDS 
NANCY MY NGUYEN 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In the world of private securities fraud litigation, class certification 
is the million-dollar question. Nearly twenty-five years ago in the 
landmark decision Basic, Inc. v. Levinson,1 the Supreme Court 
revolutionized the landscape for securities litigation. By endorsing a 
fraud-on-the-market presumption of reliance, the Court armed 
securities fraud plaintiffs with a vital tool critical to bypassing the 
previously insurmountable hurdle of establishing class-wide 
reliancea necessary element of securities fraud class actions.2 In 
recent years, private securities fraud claims have experienced 
increasing judicial scrutiny; the Roberts Court alone has generated 
more securities fraud precedent in two years than the Supreme Court 
has generated in the previous two decades.3 
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 1.  485 U.S. 224 (1988). 
 2.  See id. at 242 (“Requiring proof of individualized reliance from each member of the 
proposed plaintiff class effectively would have prevented respondents from proceeding with a 
class action, since individual issues then would have overwhelmed the common ones.”); see also 
Donald C. Langevoort, Basic at Twenty: Rethinking Fraud on the Market, 2009 WIS. L. REV. 
151, 179 (“Basic was a boon to plaintiffs, leading to a rapid increase in the number of fraud-on-
the-market suits after 1988—the number of filings had already tripled by 1991, and continued to 
rise dramatically over the next fifteen years.”). 
 3.  Robert F. Carangelo, et al., The 10b-5 Guide: A Survey of 2010-2011 Securities Fraud 
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Amgen, Inc. v. Connecticut Retirement Plans and Trust Funds4 
offers the Roberts Court yet another opportunity to shape securities 
fraud jurisprudence by further defining class certification standards. 
Amgen will require the Court to consider whether plaintiffs must 
prove materiality before invoking Basic’s fraud-on-the-market 
presumption of reliance at the class certification stage.5 Because of 
Amgen’s far-reaching implications on the future of shareholder class 
actions, it has the potential to set one of the most critical securities 
precedents since Basic. 
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND 
A. Basic and The Fraud-on-the-Market Presumption of Reliance 
Amgen’s case before the Supreme Court concerns the materiality 
and reliance elements of SEC Rule 10b-56 securities fraud claims. A 
plaintiff must show that a defendant’s misrepresentation concerned a 
material fact, and that a plaintiff relied on the misrepresented 
material fact in deciding whether to buy or sell the company’s stock.7 
To prove a fact’s materiality, a plaintiff must establish that “there is a 
substantial likelihood that a reasonable shareholder would consider 
[the misrepresented fact] important” before deciding to trade.8 The 
plaintiff must then prove the element of reliance: he must show that 
he actually relied upon the material fact before deciding to engage in 
the transaction that would ultimately lead to his injury.9 
Before Basic, putative plaintiff classes alleging securities fraud 
faced a roadblock under the requirement of Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 23(b)(3) that they establish reliance on a class-wide basis.10 
 
Litigation, WEIL, GOTSHAL & MANGES LLP (September 17, 2012), 
http://www.weil.com/files/upload/10b-5_Guide.pdf (comparing the six securities fraud cases 
decided between 2010 and 2011 with the five cases decided between 1994 and 2008). 
 4.  Amgen, Inc. v. Connecticut Retirement Plans and Trust Funds, No. 11-1085 (U.S. 
argued Nov. 5, 2012). 
 5.  Petition for Writ of Certiorari at i, Amgen, No. 11-1085 (U.S. Mar. 1, 2012). 
 6.  Rule 10b-5 is promulgated by the Securities and Exchange Commission under the 
rulemaking authority granted to it by Congress in the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. 
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 10(b) (codified as amended at 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b–5 (2012)). 
 7.  Dura Pharm., Inc. v. Broudo, 554 U.S. 336, 341 (2005). 
 8.  Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 231–32 (1988) (adopting, for the context of Rule 
10b-5 claims, the framework for determining materiality provided by TSC Indus., Inc. v. 
Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976)). 
 9.  See id. at 243 (“Reliance provides the requisite causal connection between a 
defendant’s misrepresentation and a plaintiff’s injury.”). 
 10.  See supra text accompanying note 2. 
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To prevail on a securities fraud claim, a plaintiff must show a causal 
connection between a company’s alleged misrepresentation and his 
injury.11 In face-to-face transactions, this is accomplished through a 
showing that an investor-plaintiff’s subjective pricing of a company’s 
stock, based on information the investor had from the company, 
affected his decision to buy or sell the company’s stock.12 But to 
proceed as a class, plaintiffs need to show that common questions of 
law or fact predominate over questions particular to individual 
plaintiffs.13 The certification problem is thus particularly acute for 
plaintiffs trading in an open market because individual investors may 
not be aware of statements or misstatements a company made.14 
Instead, investors rely on the market to perform the valuation process 
of securities based on all available information, disrupting the direct 
link between the company and the investor.15 Thus, a showing of 
common individualized reliance on a company’s alleged 
misrepresentations would be an unrealistic evidentiary burden for 
plaintiffs trading in an open and impersonal securities market.16 
Confronted with the rigorous requirements of class certification 
and the need for judicial efficiency, Basic adopted a pragmatic 
solution to solve the reliance problem for plaintiffs seeking class 
treatment. Out of “considerations of fairness, public policy, . . . 
probability, [and] judicial economy,” and in the interest of facilitating 
Rule 10b-5 litigation, the Basic Court relied in part on a new 
hypothesis of “efficient capital markets” to advance its innovative 
fraud-on-the-market presumption of reliance.17 The theory posits that 
in an efficient market, the price of a security reflects all material 
public information about that security.18 This assumption gives rise to 
the rebuttable presumption that investors, relying on the integrity of 
the market-set price, indirectly rely on any material 
misrepresentations absorbed into the market price at the time they 
 
 11.  Basic, 485 U.S. at 243. 
 12.  Id. 
 13.  See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3) (stating that a class action may be maintained if the “court 
finds that the questions of law or fact common to class members predominate over any 
questions affecting only individual members”). 
 14.  Merritt B. Fox, After Dura: Causation in Fraud-on-the-Market Actions, 31 J. CORP. L. 
829, 840 (2006). 
 15.  Basic, 485 U.S. at 244. 
 16.  Fox, supra note 14, at 839–40. 
 17.  See Basic, 485 U.S. at 245–46 (explaining the efficient capital markets hypothesis). 
 18.  See id. at 244 (“[The market is] the unpaid agent of the investor, informing him that 
given all the information available to it, the value of the stock is worth the market price.”). 
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decide to buy or sell a stock.19 Because this holds true for any 
purchaser or seller of company stock during the putative class period, 
plaintiffs may establish reliance on a class-wide basis, with the class 
encapsulating all persons who traded after the alleged 
misrepresentations were made. 
Although the Court intended to aid putative plaintiff classes by 
adopting the fraud-on-the-market presumption, it did not leave future 
defendants helpless. The Basic Court cautioned that this presumption 
of reliance is just that—a presumption.20 The Court acknowledged 
that “[a]ny showing that severs the link between the alleged 
misrepresentation and either the price received (or paid) by plaintiff, 
or his decision to trade at a fair market price, will be sufficient to 
rebut the presumption of reliance.”21 In sum, Basic established that 
plaintiffs may invoke the fraud-on-the-market presumption to secure 
class certification, but defendants must be afforded the opportunity to 
rebut this presumption. 
B. Basic’s Aftermath and Rule 10b-5 Class Certification 
Lower courts wrestling with Basic’s class certification framework 
have relied on two Supreme Court cases that address presumptive 
reliance and Rule 23 certification standards. In June of 2011, a 
unanimous Court held in Erica P. John Fund, Inc. v. Halliburton22 that 
plaintiffs do not need to prove loss causation to trigger the fraud-on-
the-market presumption for the purposes of class certification.23 The 
Court reasoned that loss causation has no bearing on whether an 
investor directly or presumptively relied on a misrepresentation.24 
Basic requires proof that the misrepresentations were reflected in the 
market price at the time of transaction.25 Thus, investors are presumed 
to rely on the misrepresentations by simply deciding to transact—
what the Court refers to as “transaction causation.”26 By contrast, loss 
causation requires proof that the misrepresentations reflected in the 
 
 19.  Id. at 247. 
 20.  See id. at 248 (enumerating several ways in which defendants can rebut the 
presumption of reliance). 
 21.  Id. 
 22.  131 S. Ct. 2179 (2011). 
 23.  Id. at 2186. 
 24.  Id. 
 25.  Id. 
 26.  Id. 
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market price also caused subsequent economic loss.27 Notably, the 
Court avoided considering the respondent’s argument that 
Halliburton was about price impact; that is, the effect of a 
misrepresentation on market price.28 The Court kept its decision 
narrow, holding that loss causation is not required to invoke Basic’s 
presumption of reliance because the two involve different sets of 
evidentiary facts.29 The Court left open the question of whether the 
fraud-on-the-market presumption requires a showing of price 
impact.30 
Just two weeks after Halliburton, the Court issued its decision in 
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes.31 While Dukes arose from an 
employment discrimination claim, courts and litigants in securities 
fraud class actions have relied on Dukes’s explanation of what Rule 
23 requires from courts and putative classes before certification.32 The 
Dukes Court held that the class certification inquiry requires district 
courts to apply a “rigorous analysis” to determine whether the 
prerequisites of Rule 23 are satisfied—even if such analysis requires 
the court to trudge into the merits of the action.33 Dukes identifies 
securities fraud class actions as an example where courts must 
consider a merits question during certification proceedings.34 The 
Court noted that investors must provide evidence of market efficiency 
before invoking Basic’s presumption that all investors relied on the 
accuracy of a company’s public statements.35 
Shadowing this string of Supreme Court precedent, circuit courts 
have seen an increase in litigation over class certification standards. 
These cases have highlighted the significant uncertainty related to the 
predicates necessary to trigger Basic’s fraud-on-the-market 
presumption for class certification.36 
 
 27.  Id. 
 28.  See id. at 2187 (disagreeing with the respondent’s interpretation of the issues in the 
court below and expressly declining to reach the respondent’s theory that “if a 
misrepresentation does not affect market price, an investor cannot be said to have relied on the 
misrepresentation merely because he purchased stock at that price”). 
 29.  Id. at 2186–87. 
 30.  Id. at 2187. 
 31.  131 S. Ct. 2541 (2011). 
 32.  See, e.g., In re Am. Int’l Group, Inc. Sec. Litig., 689 F.3d 229, 237–38 (2d Cir. 2012) 
(relying on the Dukes standard to review a class certification denial in a securities fraud action). 
 33.  See Dukes, 131 S. Ct. at 2551 (“Frequently that ‘rigorous analysis’ will entail some 
overlap with the merits of the plaintiff’s underlying claim. That cannot be helped.”). 
 34.  Id. at 2552 n.6. 
 35.  Id. 
 36.  Compare In re Salomon Analyst Metromedia Litig., 544 F.3d 474, 482 (2d Cir. 2008) 
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III. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
Defendants-Petitioners are Amgen, Inc. and its principal officers. 
Amgen is a publicly traded company and one of the largest 
biotechnology companies in the world. Amgen is particularly well 
known for commercializing two major pharmaceutical products: 
“Epogen” and “Aranesp.”37 Both Epogen and Aranesp are drugs that 
stimulate the formation of red blood cells in order to treat various 
types of anemia.38 
Plaintiff-Respondent Connecticut Retirement Plans and Trust 
Funds represents a class of purchasers who bought Amgen’s publicly 
traded securities between April 22, 2004, and May 10, 2007.39 On 
October 1, 2007, Connecticut Retirement brought a securities fraud 
action against Amgen in the Central District of California, alleging 
that Amgen made a series of materially false and misleading 
statements and omissions regarding Epogen and Aranesp in violation 
of Rule 10b-5.40 
Connecticut Retirement alleges that Amgen made four types of 
actionable misstatements in its earnings calls and conferences starting 
on April 22, 2004.41 Connecticut Retirement claims that these 
misstatements and omissions artificially inflated Amgen’s stock price 
until May 10, 2007, when corrective disclosures allegedly caused the 
stock price to plummet.42 Connecticut Retirement moved to certify its 
class action on behalf of all purchasers of Amgen stock between the 
date of the first actionable misstatement and the date of the 
corrective disclosures.43 
 
 
(holding that plaintiffs must prove materiality for the presumption of reliance to apply), and In 
re PolyMedica Corp. Sec. Litig., 432 F.3d 1, 8 n.11 (1st Cir. 2005) (stating in dictum that 
plaintiffs must prove materiality at class certification), with In re DVI, Inc. Sec. Litig., 639 F.3d 
623, 631 (3d Cir. 2011) (not requiring plaintiffs to prove materiality to invoke Basic’s 
presumption), and Schleicher v. Wendt, 618 F.3d 679, 685 (7th Cir. 2010) (holding that 
materiality is not one of “those aspects of the merits that affect the decisisons essential under 
Rule 23”). 
 37.  Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 5, at 4. 
 38.  Id. 
 39.  Id. 
 40.  Conn. Ret. Plans and Trust Funds v. Amgen, Inc., 660 F.3d 1170, 1172 (9th Cir. 2011), 
cert. granted, 132 S. Ct. 2742 (U.S. June 11, 2012) (No. 11-1085). 
 41.  Connecticut Retirement alleges that Amgen made material misrepresentations 
regarding (1) FDA safety concerns; (2) clinical trials involving Aranesp; (3) the safety of the 
drugs’ on-label usages; and (4) Amgen’s marketing practices. Id. at 1172–73. 
 42.  Id. at 1173. 
 43.  Id. 
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Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(3) provides the process for 
class certification.44 The Rule requires a certifying court to find that 
questions of law or fact common to all class members predominate 
over individual questions.45 The District Court for the Central District 
of California ruled that the requirements of Rule 23(b)(3) were 
satisfied because Connecticut Retirement successfully invoked the 
fraud-on-the-market presumption, thus establishing common 
reliance.46 To avail itself of the presumption, Connecticut Retirement 
tendered evidence showing that Amgen’s stock traded in an efficient 
market and that Amgen’s alleged misstatements were public.47 
Connecticut Retirement argues that because the misrepresentations 
were reflected in the market price, common reliance should be 
presumed for any investors who sold or purchased Amgen stock 
during the class period.48 
Amgen attempted to defeat class certification on two grounds. 
First, Amgen claimed that the fraud-on-the-market presumption also 
requires a showing that the misrepresentations were material, because 
immaterial statements, by definition, do not affect stock price in an 
efficient market.49 Second, Amgen, arguing the “truth-on-the-market” 
defense to Basic’s presumption of reliance, demanded the opportunity 
to rebut the presumption by showing that the truth behind each of 
Amgen’s alleged misstatements had already entered the market and, 
consequently, could not have affected the stock price.50 
The district court rejected both of Amgen’s arguments and 
granted certification because both the materiality of the alleged 
misrepresentations and the opportunity to rebut the presumption of 
 
 44.  FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a), 23(b)(3). 
 45.  Id. 
 46.  Conn. Ret., 660 F.3d at 1173. 
 47.  Id. The court characterizes the efficient market hypothesis as a theory asserting that 
“[t]he price of a stock traded in an efficient market fully reflects all publicly available 
information about the company and its business.” Id. (emphasis added). Therefore, Basic’s 
presumption only requires evidence of market efficiency and the public availability of 
information. Id. 
 48.  Id. at 1174. 
 49.  Id. at 1175 (noting Amgen’s argument that if the stock price is not affected, “no buyer 
could claim to have been misled by an artificially inflated stock price,” thus defeating the fraud-
on-the-market presumption of reliance). 
 50.  Id. at 1174; see Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 248–49 (1988) (describing one 
example of how defendants can break the causal connection between the misrepresentations 
and the price received or paid by the plaintiff (thus rebutting the presumption of reliance) by 
showing that the truth behind the misrepresentations had “credibly entered the market and 
dissipated the effects of the misstatements [on the market price]”). 
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reliance were issues on the merits and inappropriate to consider at 
the certification stage.51 Amgen appealed the certification order to the 
Ninth Circuit. The court granted Amgen’s appeal, acknowledging that 
the question of whether a putative securities fraud plaintiff class must 
prove materiality to avail itself of the fraud-on-the-market 
presumption remains unsettled.52 
IV. NINTH CIRCUIT HOLDING 
The Ninth Circuit reviewed the district court’s class certification 
order for abuse of discretion—any error of law is considered a per se 
abuse of discretion.53 The court joined the Third and Seventh Circuits, 
holding that to procure certification, a putative plaintiff class must 
prove (1) market efficiency, and (2) the public nature of the 
misrepresentations.54 The court decided that materiality, however, only 
needs to be alleged.55 According to the court, materiality is purely a 
merits-based issue that cannot be considered during class 
certification.56 
The Ninth Circuit refused to consider materiality during class 
certification because merits-based issues can be considered, at 
earliest, during summary judgment.57 If Amgen’s misrepresentations 
were immaterial, then the plaintiff class will be unable to prove a 
violation of Rule 10b-5 regardless of whether the plaintiff class could 
make use of the fraud-on-the-market presumption.58 If, on the other 
hand, the plaintiff class were required to prove materiality at the 
certification stage and failed to do so, then each plaintiff would be 
forced to prove reliance individually.59 However, the same 
immateriality that defeated class certification would deal a fatal blow 
 
 51.  Conn. Ret., 660 F.3d at 1174. 
 52.  See id. (rejecting Plaintiffs’ argument that the issue had already been decided in the 
Ninth Circuit, because the cases Plaintiffs cite were not Section 10(b) securities fraud actions). 
 53.  Id. at 1174–75. 
 54.  Id. at 1172 (declaring the court’s conformity to the Third and Seventh Circuits’ reading 
of Basic); In re DVI, Inc. Sec. Litig., 639 F.3d 623, 631 (3d Cir. 2011) (“To invoke the fraud-on-
the-market presumption of reliance, plaintiffs must show they traded shares in an efficient 
market and the misrepresentation at issue became public.” (internal citations omitted)); 
Schleicher v. Wendt, 618 F.3d 679, 685 (7th Cir. 2010). 
 55.  Conn. Ret., 660 F.3d at 1172. 
 56.  See id. at 1175 (distinguishing materiality as an element on the merits of a securities 
fraud claim, whereas the fraud-on-the-market elements of market efficiency and public 
availability are not part of the core elements of a securities fraud claim). 
 57.  Id. 
 58.  Id. (noting that a successful Rule 10b-5 claim requires proof of materiality). 
 59.  Id. 
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to the individual claims on the merits because materiality is a 
“standalone merits element” in all Rule 10b-5 claims.60 All the 
individual claims would essentially be “dead on arrival.” This common 
mortality among individual plaintiffs’ claims is exactly what makes 
class treatment appropriate; the critical question in the Rule 23 
inquiry is whether the plaintiffs’ claims will stand or fall together.61 By 
contrast, the two enumerated predicates required to invoke the fraud-
on-the-market presumption (market efficiency and the 
misrepresentation’s public availability) do not yield this common 
mortality among plaintiffs’ claims because they are not elements of 
the substantive securities fraud claim; if the class fails to show market 
efficiency, an individual securities fraud claim can still succeed on the 
merits.62 
The Ninth Circuit sided with the Third and Seventh Circuits,63 
declining to follow opposing holdings from three other circuits.64 The 
Ninth Circuit credited the opposing circuits’ rationales to a 
misreading of the following footnote in Basic: “The Court of Appeals 
held that in order to invoke the presumption, a plaintiff must allege 
and prove . . . that the misrepresentations were material.”65 While the 
three other circuits interpreted this footnote to mean that plaintiffs 
must allege and prove the materiality of misrepresentations in order 
to successfully plead the fraud-on-the-market presumption, the Ninth 
Circuit interpreted the footnote to reflect only an objective 
interpretation of the lower court’s opinion, not the Supreme Court’s 
adoption of it.66 
The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s certification order, 
holding that Connecticut Retirement did not need to prove 
 
 60.  Id. (“[T]he plaintiffs cannot both fail to prove materiality [at the certification stage] yet 
still have a viable claim for which they would need to prove reliance individually.”). 
 61.  See id. (“[W]hat matters to class certification . . . [is] the capacity of a classwide 
proceeding to generate common answers apt to drive the resolution of the litigation.” (quoting 
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2551 (2011))). 
 62.  See id. (pointing out that if plaintiffs failed to prove that the securities market was 
efficient and the misstatements were public, the effect would only bar the plaintiffs’ use of the 
fraud-on-the-market presumption of reliance; however, plaintiffs can still prove reliance 
individually, and their claims are not automatically “dead on arrival”). 
 63.  Id. at 1176 (citing In re DVI, Inc. Sec. Litig., 639 F.3d 623, 631 (3d Cir. 2011); 
Schleicher v. Wendt, 618 F.3d 679, 685 (7th Cir. 2010)). 
 64. Id. (citing In re Salomon Analyst Metromedia Litig., 544 F.3d 474, 481 (2d Cir. 2008); 
Oscar Private Equity Invs. v. Allegiance Telecom, Inc., 487 F.3d 261, 264 (5th Cir. 2007); In re 
PolyMedica Corp. Sec. Litig., 432 F.3d 1, 8 n.11 (1st Cir. 2005)). 
 65.  Id. (quoting Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 248 n.27 (1988)). 
 66.  See id. (siding with the Seventh Circuit’s interpretation of Basic’s footnote 27). 
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materiality to avail itself of the fraud-on-the-market presumption and 
that Amgen could not rebut the presumption by attacking materiality 
during the certification proceedings.67 After the court denied a re-
hearing en banc,68 Amgen petitioned for a writ of certiorari to the 
Supreme Court and on June 11, 2012, the Court granted certiorari.69 
The questions presented were: (1) whether the district court must 
require proof of materiality before certifying a plaintiff class based on 
the fraud-on-the-market theory; and (2) whether, in such a case, the 
district court must allow the defendant to present evidence rebutting 
the applicability of the fraud-on-the-market theory before certifying a 
plaintiff class based on that theory.70 
V. ARGUMENTS 
A. Petitioners’ Argument 
Amgen claims that the Ninth Circuit disobeyed Basic’s core 
principles. First, materiality is an essential element to Basic’s fraud-
on-the-market presumption.71 Therefore, Rule 23 requires materiality 
to be established at class certification for plaintiffs to use the 
presumption to satisfy common reliance.72 Second, because Basic dealt 
with class certification, the opportunity it bestowed upon defendants 
to rebut the presumption must be granted at certification—including 
the opportunity to refute materiality.73 Third, preserving the issue of 
materiality until adjudication on a claim’s merits encumbers judicial 
economy because all claims will inevitably fail without materiality, 
rendering any proceedings after certification futile.74 Furthermore, 
leaving materiality out of the certification stage imposes unfair 
pressure upon defendants because once a class has been certified, 
defendants rarely have any choice but to settle.75 Certifying a class 
without proof of materiality will force defendants to settle even 
 
 67.  Id. at 1177. 
 68.  Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 5, at 2. 
 69.  Amgen, Inc. v. Conn. Ret. Plans and Trust Funds, 132 S. Ct. 2742 (U.S. June 11, 2012) 
(No. 11-1085). 
 70.  Brief for Petitioners at i, Amgen, Inc. v. Conn. Ret. Plans and Trust Funds, No. 11-
1085 (U.S. Aug. 8, 2012). 
 71.  Id. at 8. 
 72.  Id. at 9. 
 73.  Id. at 12. 
 74.  Id. 
 75.  Id. 
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frivolous claims.76 
Amgen argues that materiality is necessary to trigger the fraud-
on-the-market presumption. Reviewing Basic’s holding, Amgen 
contends that the rebuttable presumption of reliance could not 
survive without establishing that the misrepresentations were 
material.77 Only material representations can move the price of a 
stock up or down; by contrast, immaterial representations by 
definition do not affect the stock price.78 “Absent materiality,” Amgen 
asserts, “the fundamental premise of Basic is not established, because 
an essential link between the misstatement and the plaintiff is entirely 
missing.”79 Amgen interprets the Court’s consistent inclusion of the 
concept of materiality in its subsequent explications of the Basic 
holding to indicate that materiality must be considered before 
triggering the presumption of reliance.80 Amgen contends that 
Halliburton’s recognition that the presumption of reliance is partly 
based on price impact directly supports its claim that materiality 
cannot be separated from the fraud-on-the-market presumption.81 
Since materiality is vital to Basic’s presumption of reliance, 
Amgen argues that it must be proved at class certification like all 
other fraud-on-the-market predicates.82 In Amgen’s view, it does not 
matter that materiality is also a merits-based element, a fact that the 
Ninth Circuit strongly emphasizes.83 In a claim alleging fraud-on-the-
market, Basic’s presumption is essential to both class certification—to 
 
 76.  Id. 
 77.  See id. at 17 (“Without materiality . . . there is no basis to presume an effect on the 
market price—and therefore presume class-wide reliance on a distorted price—even if the other 
fraud-on-the-market predicates are met.”) 
 78.  See id. (“[I]n an efficient market the concept of materiality translates into information 
that alters the price of the firm’s stock.” (emphasis added) (quoting Oran v. Stafford, 2 F.3d 275, 
282 (3d Cir. 2000))). 
 79.  Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 5, at 20. 
 80.  Brief for Petitioners, supra note 70, at 18–19; see, e.g., Dura Pharm., Inc. v. Broudo, 
544 U.S. 336, 341–42 (2005) (unanimously citing Basic as having approved a “presum[ption] that 
the price of a publicly traded share reflects a material misrepresentation and that plaintiffs have 
relied upon that [material] misrepresentation” (emphasis added)). 
 81.  See Brief for Petitioners, supra note 70, at 19 (noting that in Halliburton, the Court 
unanimously described Basic’s fundamental premise as an investor’s reliance on a 
misrepresentation “so long as it was reflected in the market price” when the investor trades 
(emphasis added)). 
 82.  Id. 
 83.  See id. at 36 (differentiating the certification inquiry for materiality from the merits 
inquiry, and arguing that materiality’s status as a distinct element of a Rule 10b-5 claim is 
irrelevant to its requirement under Rule 23’s analysis of whether common issues predominate 
on the element of reliance). 
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prove common reliance—and to the actual merits of the claim—to 
satisfy actual reliance.84 Thus, plaintiffs must prove all elements of the 
fraud-on-the-market presumption, including materiality, during 
certification proceedings.85 That plaintiffs will inevitably be required 
to prove the fraud-on-the-market predicates again during trial does 
not relieve them of their certification burden.86 
Amgen contends that requiring proof of materiality before 
certification is consistent with the Court’s decision in Dukes.87 
According to Amgen, Dukes’s edict, that plaintiffs bear the burden of 
proving all elements under Rule 23 and that courts have the duty to 
rigorously ensure the rule has been satisfied, mandates a full 
examination into the Basic presumption.88 Amgen argues that the 
Ninth Circuit defies the Dukes holding by extricating materiality from 
the certification inquiry simply because materiality is a merits 
element.89 Materiality is necessary to the fraud-on-the-market 
presumption, which is necessary to show common reliance.90 
Therefore, materiality must be determined at certification.91 
Furthermore, because the elements underlying the presumption of 
reliance must be satisfied before the plaintiffs can proceed as a class, 
Amgen argues that courts must afford defendants the opportunity to 
rebut the presumption at the certification stage.92 The Basic Court 
added a “powerful weapon to plaintiffs’ arsenal in securities fraud 
litigation,” but only on the condition that defendants also had the 
 
 84.  Id. at 37; see Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2552 n.6 (2011) (noting 
that in securities fraud claims, plaintiffs seeking class certification must prove the predicates to 
the fraud-on-the-market presumption, and “they will surely have to prove [the predicates] again 
at trial in order to make out their case on the merits”). 
 85.  Brief for Petitioners, supra note 70, at 36. 
 86.  See id. (asserting that a Rule 23 determination is made “before, and independently of, 
any merits determination” and that it “provides no exception” for subjects merely because their 
litigation at certification could affect the claim’s merits). 
 87.  Id. at 19. 
 88.  See id. (citing Dukes, 131 S. Ct. at 2551) (relying on Dukes’s principles that the “party 
seeking class certification must prove that the requirements of Rule 23 are in fact satisfied” and 
that district courts may certify a class “only if it concludes, after a rigorous analysis, that the 
prerequisites of Rule 23 have been satisfied.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 89.  See id. at 35–36 (reiterating the Dukes Court’s findings that class certification may 
involve “considerations that are enmeshed in the factual and legal issues comprising the 
plaintiffs’ cause of action” (quoting Dukes, 131 S. Ct. at 2551)). 
 90.  Id. at 36. 
 91.  Id. 
 92.  See id. at 40 (arguing that it makes no sense to force defendants to wait until summary 
judgment adjudication or trial to show that a plaintiff class should not have been certified in the 
first place). 
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“meaningful opportunity to rebut the presumption.”93 Amgen argues 
that the opportunity to rebut the presumption would have no force if 
rebuttal were postponed until after class certification.94 According to 
Amgen, the Ninth Circuit’s proposal of delayed rebuttal requires 
courts “to initially hear evidence regarding class certification from 
only one side . . . inevitably lead[ing] to certification in some cases in 
which it is improper.”95 
Amgen makes various policy arguments supporting its position, 
urging the Court to consider the unfair leverage that class 
certification grants to plaintiffs in settlement negotiations and the 
potential for waste of judicial resources. First, because materiality also 
needs to be litigated to prove class-wide reliance, refusing to consider 
it before class certification will waste judicial resources and accrue 
unnecessary costs.96 Second, Amgen warns of the risk of “in terrorem 
settlements” because the massive costs associated with discovery in 
securities class actions induce defendants to settle.97 Failing to 
evaluate materiality before granting certification will often mean that 
“defendants are forced to settle without any testing of the materiality 
of the alleged misstatements . . . without any showing that class 
certification was warranted in the first place.”98 Finally, every case in 
which the alleged misrepresentations are not material inevitably fails 
on the merits. Therefore, the increased costs of proceeding on a class-
wide basis after certification are wasted where materiality cannot be 
proven.99 
B. Respondent’s Argument 
Connecticut Retirement replies on two fronts: first, countering 
arguments based on the “common question” requirement of Rule 23, 
and second, noting judicial interests and policy concerns underlying 
the class action tool. Connecticut Retirement’s brief closely tracks the 
reasoning of the Ninth and Seventh Circuits.100 First, materiality is a 
 
 93.  Id. at 41. 
 94.  Id. 
 95.  Id. at 41–42. 
 96.  See id. at 27 (referring to a study demonstrating that judges spent over five times as 
many hours on certified class actions as on putative class actions that were never certified). 
 97.  Id. at 24–25; cf. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 554, 558 (2007) (adopting the 
higher “plausibility” pleading and noting that frivolous suits present an “in terrorem” threat 
that may increase settlement values). 
 98.  Brief for Petitioners, supra note 70, at 26. 
 99.  Id. 
 100.  Brief for Respondent at 18–21, Amgen, Inc. v. Conn. Ret. Plans and Trust Funds, No. 
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non-issue for certification because whether or not a misrepresentation 
is material, it will still impart the same effect on all class members’ 
claims; thus, the common issue of reliance is present as required by 
Rule 23.101 Second, the Dukes holding does not apply to the present 
case because materiality is not an element of certification.102 Third, 
requiring proof of materiality at the certification stage, before formal 
discovery, would impose too great of a burden upon securities fraud 
plaintiffs.103 Finally, allowing defendants to present a truth-on-the-
market defense to defeat certification would be an issue on the merits 
and inappropriate at certification.104 
Connecticut Retirement opens with the assertion that because 
Amgen did not challenge that Rule 23(a)’s prerequisites were met, 
the only Rule 23 requirement at issue is whether “questions of law or 
fact common to class members predominate over any questions 
affecting only individual members.”105 The crucial question for class 
certification, therefore, turns on whether plaintiffs have established 
similarity in their claims.106 Thus, Connecticut Retirement argues that 
proof of materiality at class certification is only required if absent 
such proof, individual questions would predominate over common 
questions.107 Because determining materiality is an objective standard 
and “does not relate to the characteristics of any particular investor’s 
subjective views about the importance of the information,” a 
misrepresentation’s materiality or immateriality will affect all 
investors in a similar fashion.108 Echoing the Ninth Circuit, 
Connecticut Retirement asserts that since materiality or immateriality 
will categorically affect all plaintiffs in the same way, the plaintiffs’ 
claims stand and fall together, exhibiting a resultant similarity.109 
Because the misrepresentations’ alleged immateriality will still 
 
11-1085 (U.S. Sept. 20, 2012); Conn. Ret. Plans and Trust Funds v. Amgen, Inc., 660 F.3d 1170, 
1175–76 (9th Cir. 2011), cert. granted, 132 S. Ct. 2742 (U.S. June 11, 2012) (No. 11-1085); 
Schleicher v. Wendt, 618 F.3d 679, 685 (7th Cir. 2010). 
 101.  Brief for Respondent, supra note 100, at 18. 
 102.  See id. at 19 (“[R]equiring proof of materiality for class certification goes beyond what 
is required by Rule 23 and this Court’s Rule 23 precedents.”). 
 103.  Id. at 20. 
 104.  See id. at 21 (claiming that evidence rebutting materiality cannot be considered at the 
certification stage because it defeats the claim on its merits, not on the issue of predominance of 
common questions). 
 105.  FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3); Brief for Respondent, supra note 100, at 26. 
 106.  Brief for Respondent, supra note 100, at 26. 
 107.  Id. at 22. 
 108.  Id. at 24 (referring to the “reasonable investor” standard). 
 109.  Id. at 25. 
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maintain the “common questions” status of the class, a showing that a 
misrepresentation was definitively material is not required at 
certification under Rule 23.110 
Connecticut Retirement relies on the same logic to counter 
Amgen’s claim that proof of a misrepresentation’s materiality is a 
prerequisite for triggering the fraud-on-the-market presumption for 
the purposes of certification. The fraud-on-the-market presumption 
assumes that the efficient market price will reflect any material 
misrepresentations. Consequently, reliance on those material 
misrepresentations may be presumed by the buyer’s reliance on the 
integrity of the market price.111 Evidence that the misrepresentation 
was immaterial and consequently not reflected in the market price 
will disable any individual investor in the class from proving 
reliance.112 Thus, reliance via the fraud-on-the-market presumption is a 
question common to the class because the same set of evidentiary 
facts causes the plaintiffs’ claims to stand and fall together.113 Unlike 
Amgen, which reads Basic to establish materiality as a predicate to 
the fraud-on-the-market presumption, Connecticut Retirement 
interprets Basic only as listing materiality as an element on the merits 
for the court below to consider.114 
Responding to Amgen’s argument in the alternative, that Dukes 
allows—in fact commands—judges to consider issues of merit within 
courts’ “rigorous analyses,” Connecticut Retirement reads Dukes in a 
much narrower fashion, arguing that the Dukes holding was merely 
an attempt to stabilize courts overreaching and under-reaching Rule 
23 standards.115 Dukes only directs judges to ensure that the elements 
required by Rule 23 must be considered during class certification, 
even if it means crossing into issues overlapping with the merits.116 
According to Connecticut Retirement, Dukes does not permit the 
 
 110.  Id.; see also Richard A. Nagareda, Class Certification in the Age of Aggregate Proof, 84 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 97, 131 (2009) (“[T]he question of whether the class exhibits some fatal 
similarity—a failure of proof as to all class members on an element of their cause of action—is 
properly engaged as a matter of summary judgment.”). 
 111.  See Brief for Respondent, supra note 100, at 27 (explaining the fraud-on-the-market 
theory). 
 112.  Id. at 29. 
 113.  Id. 
 114.  Id. at 42–43. 
 115.  See id. at 29–30 (citing Dukes as an example of the Court preventing courts from 
under-reaching into merits issues required by Rule 23, while also noting that other courts 
overreach into merits issues that are unnecessary under Rule 23). 
 116.  Id. at 23. 
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reverse: courts may not consider questions of merit during class 
certification proceedings that are outside the bounds of Rule 23’s 
requirements.117 Connecticut Retirement thus points to the current 
case as an example of overreaching that contravenes Dukes’s 
holding.118 A determination of materiality for the purposes of the 
fraud-on-the-market presumption is not required by Rule 23, and 
instead is an issue for summary judgment at the earliest.119 
As a matter of policy, Connecticut Retirement urges the Court not 
to request proof of materiality at certification proceedings because 
such a rule would require courts “to consider a particularly fact-
intensive issue at an early stage of the case, before full discovery.”120 
Because the burden of proof at the certification stage is the same for 
the plaintiffs as it is during trial, plaintiffs run the risk of having 
certification denied even though the discovery process after 
certification would reveal evidence of materiality.121 Responding to 
Amgen’s argument that certification without requiring proof of 
material misrepresentations would lead to “in terrorem” settlements, 
Connecticut Retirement claims the Private Securities Litigation 
Reform Act of 1995122 (PSLRA) has already addressed this danger by 
enacting procedural safeguards for defendants to protect against 
frivolous claims.123 Connecticut Retirement further lists studies 
conducted after the PSLRA that indicate settlement amounts are not 
exorbitant.124 
 
 117.  See id. at 30 (citing Richard A. Nagareda, Common Answers for Class Certification, 63 
VAND. L. REV. 149, 168 (2010)) (asserting that when courts consider issues during class 
certification that are more appropriate for summary judgment, they commit the flipside of the 
error the Supreme Court corrected in Dukes). 
 118.  Id. 
 119.  Id. 
 120.  Id. at 20. 
 121.  See id. at 36 (“Amgen’s position thus creates a significant risk that courts will fail to 
certify federal securities fraud class actions even in cases where the evidence after full discovery 
would show that the misstatements were material.”). 
 122.  Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. 104–67, 109 Stat. 737 
(codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(1)–(2) (2006)). 
 123.  See Brief for Respondent, supra note 100, at 39–40 (claiming that the PSLRA was 
enacted specifically to address “extortionate settlements” being “extracted” from companies by 
raising the pleading standard for scienter and imposing various other procedural requirements 
on securities fraud plaintiffs). 
 124.  See id. at 45 (citing ELLEN M. RYAN & LAURA E. SIMMONS, CLEARINGHOUSE & 
CORNERSTONE RESEARCH, SECURITIES CLASS ACTIONS SETTLEMENTS: 2011 REVIEW AND 
ANALYSIS 2 (2012), available at http://securities.stanford.edu/Settlements/REVIEW_1995-
2011/Settlements_Through_12_2011.pdf) (relying on empirical data that demonstrate the 
median settlement amount in 2011 was $5.8 million, and that more than half of post-PSLRA 
securities fraud cases have settled for less than $10 million, while eighty percent of post-PSLRA 
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Challenging Amgen’s request that the Court allow defendants to 
rebut materiality and the fraud-on-the-market presumption through a 
truth-on-the-market defense, Connecticut Retirement reiterates the 
class-wide effect argument. Connecticut Retirement argues that if the 
truth were publicly available and misrepresentations could not have 
been said to alter the stock price, the immateriality would still apply 
to all putative class members’ claims.125 A truth-on-the-market defense 
would cause the plaintiffs’ claims to stand or fall as one.126 Moreover, 
Connecticut Retirement contends that a truth-on-the-market defense 
goes straight to merits-based issues because it proves no one was 
defrauded, and is therefore inappropriate for consideration during 
class certification proceedings.127 Finally, Connecticut Retirement 
points out that there are alternative ways to defeat the presumption 
at class certification, either by rebutting the predicates of market 
efficiency or the misrepresentations’ public availability.128 
VI. ANALYSIS AND LIKELY DISPOSITION 
The Supreme Court’s answer to whether materiality is an essential 
element of class certification has great implications for the future of 
securities fraud class actions. Because securities fraud class actions 
rarely proceed to trial on the merits, the Supreme Court’s decision 
will likely have a significant effect on settlement negotiations. A 
decision for Connecticut Retirement will allow investors to effectively 
guarantee substantial settlement amounts after certification; a 
decision for Amgen will hinder shareholders from using the class 
action tool to keep fraudulent business practices at bay. If materiality 
is required for Basic’s presumption, courts will be faced with the same 
daunting task at certification that they struggle with during merits 
proceedings: unraveling whether the price change was caused by 
fraudulent or legitimate statements. The Court’s decision likely will 
echo the same practical and policy-oriented considerations espoused 
by Basic and lead to the adoption of a moderate approach in order to 
maintain a balance between business and shareholder interests. 
 
cases have settled for less than $25 million). 
 125.  See id. at 51–52 (“[D]isproving materiality would not demonstrate the existence of 
individual questions; it would negate the elements of materiality and reliance for all class 
members alike.”). 
 126.  Id. 
 127.  Id. at 52–53. 
 128.  Id. at 53. 
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A. Future Implications for Publicly Held Companies and Their 
Shareholders 
If the Supreme Court affirms the Ninth Circuit’s decision, 
businesses will continue to face considerable financial obligations to 
certified investor classes who may or may not have legally meritorious 
claims. Aggregating shareholders’ claims can lead to threats of 
staggering potential losses if the class prevails on the merits.129 Rather 
than risk the prospect of financial ruin, defendants are quick to settle 
for amounts disproportionate to the merits of the shareholders’ 
claims. This only invites more frivolous lawsuits.130 Defendants are 
frequently at the plaintiffs’ mercy after class certification. Without a 
requirement of materiality at the certification stage, defendants’ only 
options are to settle and avoid additional costs, or wait until 
adjudication on summary judgment to test the claim’s legitimacy. 
If the Court sides with Amgen, plaintiffs will be forced to 
assemble a case proving materiality prior to actual discovery. Plaintiffs 
are already encumbered by the requirement to plead facts supporting 
loss causation131 and Basic’s certification requirement of expert 
evidence proving market efficiency.132 An additional requirement of 
proof of materiality before certification may add considerably to 
plaintiffs’ burden. If this were not already a significant burden to class 
action litigation, plaintiffs would have to prove materiality by a 
preponderance of the evidence, a burden of proof that is higher than 
the standard by which plaintiffs need to prove a genuine issue of 
material fact to defeat a motion for summary judgment.133 This would 
act as an additional barrier to class action litigation.134 Front-loading 
 
 129.  See, e.g., Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Credit Suisse First Boston (USA), Inc., 482 
F.3d 372, 379 (5th Cir. 2007) (reviewing a district court’s certification order in which plaintiffs 
alleged damages totaling $40 billion). 
 130.  See Robert G. Bone & David S. Evans, Class Certification and the Substantive Merits, 
51 DUKE L.J. 1251, 1302 (2002) (“[L]ack of attention to the merits make[s] the class action an 
attractive vehicle for frivolous suits.”). 
 131.  See Dura Pharm., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 346 (2005) (holding that plaintiffs must 
present facts in order to adequately allege that the fraud proximately caused actual economic 
loss, not just that the misrepresentations inflated the stock price). 
 132.  See In re DVI, Inc. Sec. Litig., 639 F.3d 623, 633 (3d Cir. 2011) (noting that because 
market efficiency is the cornerstone behind Basic’s presumption, Rule 23 requires judges to 
weigh, if necessary, the conflicting expert testimony on market efficiency before certification). 
 133.  See Brief for Respondent, supra note 100, at 32 (noting that some courts believe the 
Rule 23 requirements are subject to a preponderance-of-the-evidence standard). 
 134.  See Brief for Public Citizen, Inc., as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondent at 13, 
Amgen, Inc. v. Conn. Ret. Plans and Trust Funds, No. 11-1085 (U.S. Sept. 27, 2012) (noting the 
advisory committee notes to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23, which state that allowing 
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the lengthy, fact-based inquiries surrounding materiality before 
certification can hinder or even discourage investors from pursuing 
legitimate securities fraud claims, undercutting Basic’s intended 
purpose. Such obstacles would prevent plaintiffs from keeping 
businesses in check, thereby undermining the deterrent effect of 
private securities fraud claims. 
B. Challenges for Trial Courts Assessing Materiality Under Basic’s 
Presumption 
A discussion of whether materiality is a predicate to triggering 
Basic’s presumption could force the Court to plunge into deeply 
tangled issues, such as the reliability of the market efficiency 
hypothesis and Basic’s fraud-on-the-market presumption. Under 
Basic’s presumption, courts need to determine whether fraudulent 
statements cause a plaintiff’s injury based on the impact that such 
statements had on stock price.135 However, an impersonal market 
continually absorbs large amounts of public information. Thus, 
proving the actual impact of a particular statement is very difficult, 
and sometimes impossible. In Dura Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Broudo,136 
the Court addressed requirements for proving loss causation in the 
context of fraud-on-the-market claims, holding that evidence of price 
inflation resulting from misstatements was insufficient.137 Instead, 
plaintiffs needed to have shown that corrective disclosures also 
caused a price drop to connect the defendant’s fraud to the plaintiff’s 
economic loss.138 Dura’s narrow holding that price inflation alone is 
insufficient has left lower courts struggling to find loss causation when 
a price drop may not be the direct result of a corrective disclosure.139 
Dura and its progeny demonstrate the difficulty of disaggregating 
causes of price impact in an open market. If materiality is held to be 
 
controlled discovery to determine certification would cause significant expansion to merits-
based discovery during preliminary certification proceedings). 
 135.  See Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 247 (1988) (justifying a presumption of 
reliance because the misstatements have been disseminated into the market and are reflected in 
the market price). 
 136.  544 U.S. 336 (2005). 
 137.  Id. at 342. 
 138.  Id. at 347. 
 139.  See, e.g., Phillips v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., No. 10-15910, 2012 WL 3854795, at *3 (11th 
Cir. Sept. 6, 2012) (per curiam) (affirming the district court’s grant of summary judgment for 
defendants because plaintiffs could not establish that it was the corrective disclosures that 
caused the price drop, when the disclosures were bundled with multiple pieces of non-
fraudulent information that also could have caused the identified price drop). 
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essential to Basic’s presumption, then courts and litigants will face the 
challenge of unraveling misleading information from the bundle of all 
information that may have contributed to a price change.140 
Fraudulent statements and corrective disclosures are frequently 
released as part of larger packages of information, increasing the 
difficulty of proving a specific statement’s materiality. If the 
misrepresentation precedes a stock price increase, courts would need 
to determine whether it was the misrepresentation—rather than any 
legitimate good news that was released with it—that inflated the stock 
price. By contrast, if plaintiffs attempt to show the materiality of the 
misrepresentation by pointing to a price drop following corrective 
disclosures, the price drop could be the result of other bad news 
bundled with the corrective disclosure. 
C. An Adaptable Line of Precedent 
The relevant issues under Basic’s fraud-on-the-market 
presumption are deeply connected to the economic and policy 
interests of both public companies and investors. As this is a relatively 
new area of legal doctrine saturated with ambiguities, the Supreme 
Court will likely be sharply divided on the issue. The best precedential 
indicators of the how the Supreme Court will rule come from its 2011 
decisions in Halliburton and Dukes. 
Halliburton’s precedent can substantiate a decision for either 
party. For Connecticut Retirement, direct language from the 
Halliburton decision suggests that the Court may preclude 
determination of materiality at the class certification stage. Like loss 
causation, materiality is “distinct” from actual reliance, and is a 
distinct element of a Rule 10b-5 claim.141 The Court may find that 
materiality remains distinct from the presumed reliance required by 
Basic’s presumption, and is unnecessary for plaintiffs to establish in 
order to invoke the presumption. 
A strong argument for Amgen is the Court’s distinction in 
Halliburton between reliance—or transaction causation—and loss 
causation. Logic does not support making loss causation a 
precondition to the presumption of reliance because reliance is 
 
 140.  See Langevoort, supra note 2, at 184 (identifying problems with showing that the 
misrepresentation caused the price change when other information, such as good news or bad 
news, accompanies misrepresentations or corrective disclosures). 
 141.  Erica P. John Fund, Inc. v. Halliburton, 131 S. Ct. 2179, 2184 (2011). 
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preliminary to any economic loss.142 However, materiality, unlike loss 
causation, is not as easily distinguishable from reliance. The primary 
justification for presuming reliance is the idea that an efficient market 
reflects all publicly available information; investors depend on the 
market’s efficiency to account for information the investor would 
otherwise rely on individually.143 The Court’s emphasis on the efficient 
market hypothesis in Dukes, Halliburton, and Dura arguably may 
have contained an implicit understanding that only if 
misrepresentations are material can they be reflected in the efficient 
market price.144 
The Dukes decision has demonstrated the Court’s willingness to 
entertain consideration of the merits at the certification stage. 
However, Amgen faces the argument that Dukes is distinguishable 
from the present case, and its holding does not apply with the same 
force to securities fraud claims. The Court may find that Dukes 
necessitated the merits inquiry because of the claim’s nature as an 
employment discrimination suit.145 A class member’s personal 
discrimination by a company, as in Dukes, requires a much more 
individualized, fact-laden inquiry than the impersonal market Basic 
was intended to address. 
D. The Opportunity for Rebuttal: An Equitable Compromise 
The Court’s way out may be to focus on Amgen’s second 
argument: that defendants must have the opportunity to rebut the 
fraud-on-the-market presumption of reliance before certification, 
regardless of whether plaintiffs must prove materiality. Accounting 
for the considerable future impact on both parties and the Court’s 
interest in following its own precedent, the Justices may adopt a 
 
 142.  Loss causation requires proof that the misrepresentation that affected the stock price 
also caused subsequent economic loss through a later decline in value, not merely because the 
investor relied upon the artificially inflated price on the date of purchase. Id. at 2186. 
 143.  See id. (“Basic’s fundamental premise [is that] an investor presumptively relies on a 
misrepresentation so long as it was reflected in the market price at the time of his transaction.”). 
 144.  See, e.g., id. at 2185 (“P]laintiffs must demonstrate that the alleged misrepresentations 
were publicly known (else how would the market take them into account?) . . . .” (emphasis 
added)); Dura Pharm., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 341–42 (2005) (“[Basic] nonconclusively 
presume[s] that the price of a publicly traded share reflects a material misrepresentation and 
that plaintiffs have relied upon that misrepresentation as long as they would not have bought 
the share in its absence.” (emphasis added)). 
 145.  See Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2552 (2011) (“In this case, proof of 
commonality necessarily overlaps with respondents’ merits contention that Wal-Mart engages in 
a pattern or practice of discrimination . . . [because] the crux of the [Title VII claim] inquiry is 
the reason for a particular employment decision.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
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hybrid approach similar to the Third Circuit’s practice of not 
requiring proof of materiality from plaintiffs at certification, but 
instead allowing defendants to affirmatively rebut the fraud-on-the-
market presumption at the certification stage.146 To remain consistent 
with the “rebuttable presumption” framework established by Basic, 
the Court will likely require defendants to bear both the burden of 
production and the burden of persuasion if defendants wish to avail 
themselves of the rebuttal right. This approach would allow the Court 
to avoid placing undue evidentiary demands upon the plaintiffs at 
certification, while still allowing defendants to use the defense Basic 
handed down in parcel with its fraud-on-the-market presumption. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
Amgen promises to clarify the uncertainty regarding Basic’s fraud-
on-the-market presumption. Because of Amgen’s significant potential 
impact on future securities fraud litigation, the Court is likely to adopt 
an approach that does not require an initial showing of materiality, 
but would afford defendants an opportunity to rebut the fraud-on-
the-market presumption of reliance before class certification. 
Nevertheless, there is no easy way for the Supreme Court to endorse 
one side of the circuit split without significantly affecting the 
landscape of securities class actions. Whatever the decision may be, 
lower courts will undoubtedly struggle to rein in any polarizing effects 
that the Court’s decision may have on parties’ advantages in securities 
fraud litigation. 
 
 
 146.  See In re DVI, Inc. Sec. Litig., 639 F.3d 623, 648–49 (3d Cir. 2011) (holding that while 
plaintiffs do not need to prove materiality to trigger the fraud-on-the-market presumption, 
defendants have the opportunity to rebut the presumption before certification). 
